Case Summary
On September 4, 2006, shortly after two o’clock in the morning, two police officers were notified of an ongoing car chase concerning a stolen vehicle. Both the driver and passenger were described only as “Native.” The officers, Cst. Meikle and Cst. Aiken, became involved in the car chase at 2:23 a.m.1 They observed the stolen car, but could not see the suspects inside, and were soon informed that the car chase had been called off.2
A few minutes later, however, the officers encountered the stolen car again when it ran a stop sign and struck the right fender of their police cruiser.3 During this event, the officers were able to see the driver for only “[a] second or two,” respectively from about 4 or 12 feet away, and observed that the suspect was an Indigenous man.4 Neither officer could see the passenger clearly enough to give any description.5 They did not record their observations of the driver.6
At 2:28 a.m., the officers were informed that the two suspects had subsequently abandoned the car and fled on foot. At 2:48 a.m., they learned that one person – Cody Klyne, an Indigenous man – had been apprehended and taken into custody.7 They went immediately to the detention area and observed Klyne. Both officers agreed that Klyne, who was the only man in police custody at that time, was the person they had seen earlier driving the stolen car.8
On this basis, Klyne was charged with dangerous driving, motor vehicle flight, possession of stolen goods, and breach of recognizance.9 At his trial, the Crown’s identification of Klyne as the driver rested entirely on “Officers Meikle and Aiken’s very brief initial observation of the driver during the stressful seconds surrounding the collision, and their subsequent identification of the detained individual as that driver.”10 Their testimony was wholly based on their memory of seeing the driver, since they did not record their observations.11 Klyne was convicted on all four charges.12
Klyne appealed his conviction to the Manitoba Court of Appeal, asserting that his convictions were unreasonable because they derived solely from the police eyewitness evidence.13
On August 16, 2007, The Manitoba Court of Appeal overturned Klyne’s convictions and entered an acquittal on all four charges, on the basis that the trial judge had erred in relying on the officers’ “identification of the detained accused [as the driver] to conclude that the Crown had proven identity beyond a reasonable doubt.”14
In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized that “[t]he dangers of eyewitness identification are well known,” and that appropriate caution must thus accompany the “fact-finder’s approach to eyewitness identification” so as “to safeguard against wrongful convictions based upon unreliable testimony from witnesses who may testify honestly but mistakenly about what they have observed.”15
In Klyne’s specific case, the Court expressed concern that the officers had observed the driver for such a brief period, were not able to provide a detailed description, and had made no observations about the passenger at all.16 The Court noted that two Indigenous men appeared to be involved in the car chase, but only one person was apprehended, meaning that “the person in custody [i.e., Klyne] could have been the passenger, not the driver.”17 Moreover, “there was no clear evidence” from either officer as to whether the description they gave at Klyne’s trial “was formulated just after the one-or-two-second initial observation from their car or, rather, whether it was a product of their subsequent and longer opportunity to observe the detained accused some 20 minutes later.”18 As a result, the Court concluded that there was “a strong basis to doubt the reliability” of the officers’ identification, and agreed with Klyne that it was unreasonable to convict him.19
Although no new evidence was introduced on appeal, Klyne’s case is included in this Registry because it contains indicia of wrongful convictions, namely the frailties of eyewitness identification, and likely cross-racial identification.20